Other meanings of One country, two systems
Cross-Strait relations
One country, two systems (Taiwan plan) is the Chinese Communist Party’s proposed framework for bringing Taiwan under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China while allowing the island to retain a separate social, economic, and administrative system. Beijing presents it as a peaceful-unification formula, but Taiwan’s government and most of its public reject the proposal, and no government in Taiwan has accepted it.
The Taiwan plan applies the principle of one country, two systems to a proposed cross-Strait settlement. The concept was first developed for Taiwan in the early 1980s, after the Chinese Communist Party had formulated it chiefly as a means of resolving the status of Hong Kong and Macao. In 1981, National People’s Congress chairman Ye Jianying outlined a nine-point proposal that promised Taiwan a high degree of autonomy after unification, including control over its own social and economic affairs and the possibility of retaining its armed forces. 1
Deng Xiaoping subsequently linked the formula to peaceful reunification and described it as compatible with Taiwan’s existing way of life. The proposal assumes that Taiwan would become part of one Chinese state, while its capitalist economy, legal arrangements, and local institutions would continue under a special administrative status. The arrangement is therefore not a confederation or a treaty between equal sovereign states; sovereignty would rest with Beijing.
Beijing’s stated offer combines national sovereignty with extensive, but ultimately subordinate, regional autonomy. Official proposals have promised that Taiwan could retain its existing social system, private property, religious practices, economic model, and cultural traditions, while Taiwan’s political parties and social organizations could continue to operate within the constitutional order of the unified state. Recent Chinese policy documents also describe the possibility of Taiwan managing its own affairs and participating in international economic activity under an agreed framework.
The plan leaves decisive questions unresolved, including the scope of Taiwan’s autonomy, the authority of the central government over defense and foreign affairs, the constitutional basis of the arrangement, and the status of Taiwan’s military. Beijing has indicated that it would not renounce the use of force against what it calls separatism or outside intervention. 2 The proposal thus combines assurances of self-government with a final authority that would remain in the People’s Republic of China.
Taiwan’s political system has rejected the Taiwan plan as incompatible with the island’s democratic self-government and de facto autonomy. Taiwan’s government maintains that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to one another, while successive administrations have opposed Beijing’s definition of the “one China” principle. Public opposition intensified after developments in Hong Kong, where the autonomy promised under its own version of the formula has been widely debated following the 2019 protests, the 2020 national security law, and later electoral changes. 3
Hong Kong is not a direct legal precedent for Taiwan: its handover resulted from an international treaty and British-Chinese negotiations, whereas Taiwan has never been governed by the People’s Republic of China. Nevertheless, Hong Kong functions in Taiwan’s political debate as evidence that formal autonomy can be narrowed by central authorities. The United States does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state but maintains unofficial relations and opposes unilateral changes to the cross-Strait status quo.
The Taiwan version has never been a single fixed constitutional blueprint; its terms have changed with Beijing’s strategic circumstances and Taiwan’s political environment. Early proposals emphasized economic and social continuity, while later documents added language about consultation, national development, and Taiwan’s participation in international affairs. The offer has also been paired with a larger narrative of the “Chinese nation,” which frames unification as a historical and national mission rather than merely a territorial bargain.
A less visible feature is the distinction between peaceful-unification policy and the legal basis for coercion. China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law authorizes “non-peaceful means” under specified conditions, including Taiwan’s secession or the exhaustion of possibilities for peaceful reunification. 4 This dual-track structure means that the Taiwan plan is both an autonomy proposal and part of a broader policy that preserves military pressure. Taiwan’s elections, civil society, and expanding separate identity have made acceptance increasingly remote, while Beijing continues to present the formula as its preferred political solution.
The Taiwan plan is a proposed policy framework, not an implemented constitutional arrangement; its terms are defined by Beijing and disputed by Taiwan.
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